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  John Gibson

1. Introduction
An interesting difference between discussions of interpretation
in the “analytic” and “continental” traditions (this distinction
generally does much more harm than good but in this case it
is helpful) is that on the whole analytic philosophers prefer to
talk about interpretations and their continental brethren are
often more interested in talking about interpreters. One sees
this especially in various continental attempts to “enfranchise”
the interpreter, frequently, an analytic type might respond, at
the expense of the work and its author. If certain strands of
postwar continental thought have sought to see meaning in art
(and elsewhere) as originating in the mouths of interpreters as
much as in the minds of artists, the analytic tradition has been
more interested in exploring how interpretations can be seen
as cognitively responsive to and so revelatory of the meanings
to be found in artworks. Perhaps unsurprisingly, continental
theories of interpretation tend to come off as more provocative
and, frankly, sexier, whereas analytic theories of interpretation
often seem the more staid and sensible of the two.
Laurent Stern’s Interpretative Reasoning is that rare book that
succeeds in bringing together what is best from these two
traditions while leaving aside what makes them appear bloated
or boring. One might expect so much from Stern, whose
fluency in both philosophical traditions is always in full view in
his work. Though I won’t be much interested in the French
and American inflections of Stern’s theory in the following, I do
hope to show that his theory allows us to acknowledge the
presence of the interpreter without ever sacrificing the idea
that her voice, if it is to be a genuinely interpretive voice,
must ultimately speak for, and not in place of, artworks. In
other words, in Stern’s theory one gets continental allure and
analytic reasonableness, and this is surely a good thing. As
one does on these occasions, I will also raise a few worries.
But my basic hope is to show that Stern’s theory is eminently
worthy of philosophical attention.       
2. Stern’s Voice
I think that the first thing one would be inclined to say about
Stern’s book is that it is challenging. The prose is clear and
urbane, so it is not challenging in that sense. It is challenging
in the sense that it does not tolerate careless readers, as I
know, since I was one. The first time I read it, I noticed only
what was absent. Stern does not spend much time addressing
the views of other major players in the debate. He does have
illuminating things to say about Richard Wollheim and Arthur
Danto, but the other usual suspects are, if not absent, then
very much in the back-row of this book. Nor does Stern
structure his book around a discussion of the issues,
problems, and paradoxes that have been driving work in the
theory of interpretation in Anglophone aesthetics for the last
thirty-odd years. The book did not seem especially interested
in whether we should be intentionalists or conventionalists,

whether critical monism or critical pluralism should rule the
day, whether we should be relativists, realists, or
constructivists, and so on. These issues pop up in the book,
but they do not guide it. They have, at best, brief cameos.
For these reasons, the book struck me as having been written
largely in the void.
Fortunately, I reread it (I had to, as I was asked to review it),
this time carefully, and the experience was one of reading an
entirely different book. For one, the careful reader will see
that Stern always has the major players and issues in mind,
and in subtle ways his book is constantly gesturing towards
them. But more importantly, the careful reader will see that
Stern, in his quiet and civilized way, is asking the reader to
consider a very different approach to the theory of
interpretation. Stern’s interests are not in the sorts of metainterpretative issues that concern most philosophers. His focus
is on the principles, concerns, and goals that inform actual
interpretative claims, so much so that his book often makes
the philosophy of interpretation seem to be primarily a chapter
of practical philosophy. Stern wishes to know when, and why,
we offer interpretations. What prompts the interpretive
enterprise itself, and what are our options when responding to
these promptings? For whom do we speak when we make
interpretive claims: merely ourselves, ourselves and those
sufficiently like us, or, with hope, everyone? When are
interpretations sincere, when are they “off the wall”? And
when do my interpretative claims reveal more about me than
the nature of the object I take myself to be rendering
intelligible? In all of these cases, and the many more like them
that Stern explores, the focus is descriptive, in the
methodological sense Ryle or Wittgenstein would approve of:
it is an example of philosophy as the exploration of the logical
geography of our existing concepts and practices.
Stern builds his account around a study of the interpretive
voice, and it is this notion of voice that makes his contribution
to the philosophy of interpretation so unique. We begin to
speak in the interpretive voice when we are aware that what
we say is not of the order of straightforward discovery, for
when we take ourselves to have simply discerned an objective
property of an object, there for all to see, we speak in the
idiom of description rather than interpretation. This keeps the
distinction between interpretation and description tidy, and it
reveals how far Stern is from the view, still popular in
literature departments, that there is no such thing as noninterpretative understanding. As Wittgenstein pointed out, the
naïve belief in the omnipresence of interpretation drains the
concept of interpretation of all content,[1] and Stern’s way of
setting up his notion of voice ensures that Wittgenstein’s
warning is heeded. As Stern sensibly insists, interpretation
steps on the scene when there is a question of meaning.
When I say in the descriptive mode of speech, “My daughter
finds my stories boring,” I am expressing a kind of certainty:
I take myself to be not interpreting but simply reporting on
her state of mind. Were I to make the same claim in the
interpretive voice, my statement would implicitly point up the
possibility of thinking other than I do, for if I thought there
was no other possible way her behavior could be taken, if I
thought that there was no real question as to what it amounts
to, I would not see an interpretation as prompted in the first

place.
The interpretive voice always bears the mark of the personal.
It speaks the dialect of individual judgment, of opinion (the
sense of “opinion” we employ when we speak of a “legal
opinion” and not the one undergraduates everywhere enlist
when defending relativism). But we do not, for Stern, speak
only for ourselves: this would distinguish interpretation from
description by assimilating interpretation to expressions of
mere taste, which would be to err in the opposite direction.
The deliverances of a sincere interpretive voice (more on
sincerity in a moment) occupy a space midway between the
fully objective and the purely subjective, between claims with
essential reference to the subject and those which gesture
entirely in the direction of the world. When we speak in the
interpretive voice, we express an individual judgment, a way
we think an object should be understood, that implicitly makes
a claim about how the others will, or ought to, make sense of
the object. That we apply reasons when making interpretive
judgments would seem to suggest this much, since a reason, if
it truly is a reason, should provide the same support to others’
judgments as it does to mine. (This does not mean that if we
share a reason it shall inevitably lead us to the same
interpretive judgment, since we will not share many other,
potentially competing reasons, all which can rear their heads
and bring us to make sense of the world in different ways). I
am not sure Stern would approve of the following way of
putting it, but all this strikes me as showing that when we
speak in the interpretive voice, we call on others to see the
world as we do, and so to this extent we offer up a claim to
community. When we speak in the interpretive voice, we
inevitably issue an invitation to a shared way of making sense
of some text, artwork, person, or culture.
There are two ways in which the interpretive voice makes a
claim to community. According to Stern, interpretations
implicitly express one of two principles or “conversation
terminators,” as Stern calls them: the Universalizability
Principle and the Restrictive Principle. The Restrictive Principle
makes the weaker, though still significant, claim to
community, namely, that “only reasonable persons who are
familiar with the circumstances understand what is at issue the
way I do.” (p. 10) As the name suggests, the
Universalizability Principle expresses the stronger claim to
community, and it has the implicit form of a claim to the effect
that “every reasonable person who is familiar with the
circumstances understands what is at issue the way I do.” (p.
9) What we appeal to when trying to justify an interpretation
is not a decisive, fully objective standard of rightness -– there
aren’t any available to us (we wouldn’t be interpreting if there
were) -- but rather a conception of what “reasonable and wellinformed interpreters will (or would, or even ought to) say in
interpretative situations.”(p. 1) The Universalizability Principle
states that any such reasonable and well-informed person
would offer the interpretation I offer; that this is how anyone
possessed of sound mind and decent education will view the
matter. But there are, of course, many occasions in which we
must retreat to a weaker claim to community, such as when
we interpret in the face of insurmountable disagreement. In
these cases we invoke the Restrictive Principle and speak in
the humbler tone of one who claims only that only others like

her, who share, say, her particular values, commitments,
routes of interest, and habits of thought, will interpret some
object as she does.
For reasons that should now be clear, the Universalizability
Principle invokes the image of the agreement of others, of
“every reasonable person,” not because it somehow logically
derives this agreement from an unassailable point of
argumentative departure, whatever that might be. To put it in
terms I hope Stern would approve of, interpretations
expressive of this principle gesture towards a universal
community because they take themselves to have won a
certain right, to be entitled to use a certain kind of
vocabulary. When interpreting in the “universal voice,” the
interpreter is “understood as if he discovered certain
properties in an artwork” (p. 159). But “had he in fact
discovered such properties, he would not need to support the
statement of his discovery with the Universalizability Principle.
He would be entitled to claim that he had spoken accurately
about facts or true descriptions concerning an artwork” (p.
159). When we interpret in the universal voice, our
interpretation is expressive of a kind of confidence:
confidence in the fact that we have hit upon the best available
interpretation, one that “every reasonable person” should find
compelling. In this case, the right we take ourselves to have
won is that of using the language of discovery, of speaking as
if we have passed from interpretation to description, when in
fact we really haven’t. Stern illustrates this with an example of
an imagined art critic:
Everyone—including the critic whose understanding and
imagination shaped an interpreted object out of the perceptual
object she saw—ought to see it as the critic “saw” it; everyone
ought to believe that he sees a perceptual object, when in fact
he "sees" an interpreted object. In demanding that everyone
see it as she "saw" it, the professional critic speaks with a
universal voice. Are we witnessing a sleight of hand, when the
critic first wants to report with her own individual voice what
she "saw" in a given artwork, and then speaks with a universal
voice in demanding that everyone see it as she "saw" it? One
answer is that we must admit that this is indeed a sleight of
hand. In accepting this answer, we admit that the formal
properties attributed to a painting are understood as if they
were found in that painting, as if they were perceptual
properties — while in fact they are not found in it and they are
not its perceptual properties. A second answer is that the
sleight of hand must be rejected, and the formal properties
attributed to a painting are its perceptual properties. This
answer is unacceptable, for it collapses aesthetic judgments
into perceptual judgments. (p. 153).
One has likely already detected a bit of Kant in all of this.
Since the other symposiasts will discuss Stern’s use of Kant in
considerable detail, I will only mention one feature of it here.
The passage from the purely individual to the universal voice
is not made along the rails of logical entailment. It is not that
we hit upon some impersonal grounds for seeing the object as
we do. It is, after all, our “understanding and imagination”
that leads us to see the object this way, and so the grounds of
our judgment are, to this extent, personal, even in a sense
“subjective,” though this term connotes somewhat

uncontrollably when speaking of interpretation and so is
perhaps best left aside. When we interpret in the universal
voice, one of the reasons it bears the mark of the “universal”
is because the judgment’s mode of self-expression cancels out
reference to the personal grounds that gave rise to it and so
what is left is the image of how it will strike one, and not this
or that one. Like Kant’s judgment of taste, Stern’s conception
of interpretative judgments in the universal voice makes
essential reference to the object and how it is, rather than
how it merely seems to me. This is a consequence of the
implicit “as if” claim the Universalizability Principle embodies.
A concept that appears throughout the book is that of
interpretative sincerity. Stern’s discussion of sincerity allows
him to offer a novel analysis of something every theory of
interpretation must address: the notion of fidelity to the object
of interpretation. In most popular theories of interpretation,
fidelity (or a concept amounting to it) is understood in
epistemological or metaphysical terms. Is the object (really or
actually) propertied as a certain interpretation says it is and, if
so, how might we know this, what conditions must present
themselves if we are to be justified in asserting this? Stern
does not ignore these meta-interpretative issues, but he
explores them in terms not of a conception of an abstract
match between an object and an interpretation of it but of the
interpreter’s attempt to be faithful to the object of her
interpretive scrutiny. Stern recasts fidelity as sincerity of
expression, of a voice that strives to speak for another rather
than on behalf of an agenda or ideology that the interpreter
effectively just imposes upon another.
Unpacking how this notion of sincerity works requires an
additional battery of distinctions. The unproblematic sort of
interpretation, at least for the question of sincerity, is what
Stern calls “natural” or “surface” interpretations, and these can
be expressed in two “moods.” When spoken in the “indicative”
mood, “the interpreter tries to understand the speaker’s words
as the speaker would understand them if he were in the
interpreter’s place.” (page 13, emphasis added) Assume I am
attempting to interpret the behavior of my sexually akratic
colleague. (In this instance it is helpful to consider the
interpretation of behavior; I shall consider the interpretation of
artworks below.) I offer a sincere interpretation of the natural
and indicative kind if I take what I say to be the interpretation
of his behavior the akratic himself would acknowledge as
correct. But this “would” is funny, of course. In the indicative
mood, the claim is that my interpretation matches (there’s the
indicative) his self-understanding, or at any rate it would
match it were my colleague called to account for his behavior.
In short, what I say is what he would say about himself, and
the “would” here is not contrary-to-fact but reports a
condition that we would expect to be fulfilled. But it is
possible that my akratic colleague is incapable of seeing his
behavior for what it is. Perhaps he blames his problems on
the constant intrusions of Temptation to which he sees himself
as a helpless victim. In this case, the “would” does not
indicate the interpretation he would actually give, for he is not
capable of honest self-assessment. And so I offer a natural
interpretation in the “subjunctive” mood and I claim something
very different. I claim that my interpretation is the one he
would agree with if he were reasonable and honest, which he

is not.
Note that my interpretation in the subjunctive mood still has a
claim to reaching all the way to the facts of the matter as my
colleague, too, would understand them. It is simply that a
defect on the part of my colleague prevents him from
acknowledging this. These facts are features of who he is, and
it is his inability to see something about himself that makes
these facts unavailable to him. And here we arrive at the
general point all of this announces. Sincere natural
interpretations in either the indicative or subjunctive mood
cast the source of potential confirmation as internal to the
object of interpretation itself. Assuming my interpretation is
correct, my akratic neighbor can in principle verify this simply
by taking an honest look within.
In the case of natural interpretations in both moods, we make
use of the Universalizability Principle, since we are working
with a conception of what “every reasonable person” would
say, regardless of whether one is sufficiently reasonable to
meet this condition. But we often go beyond this as
interpreters and do something quite suspicious, something
that calls into question our interpretive sincerity. Say I have
been reading a certain book to which I’ve become beholden, a
book my akratic colleague has not read. By the light of this
book I find myself moved to offer the following interpretation.
I interpret his behavior as causally linked to Man’s Fall from
Grace or, if I have been reading a rather different book, as a
result of the inevitable insatiability of bourgeois desire in late
capitalist society. Now it won’t matter at all how reasonable or
capable of honest self-assessment my colleague is, which is
why my theory-laden interpretation cannot be seen as a sort
of excessively subjunctive natural interpretation (we are well
beyond that), for he can look within himself as much as he
wishes and he will not find anything that could make my
interpretation adequate to his self-understanding. Nothing
“internal” to him could possibly perform a justificatory role
here. This is because the only way he could share my
conception of the relevant facts of the matter would be if he
were to embrace something that is foreign to him, namely the
“theory” in virtue of which I make sense of his behavior.
In this respect, for my akratic colleague to come to see his
behavior as I do, he must join a very limited community: the
community of all those who embrace my theory. Put
differently, it is in virtue of the theory that many of the
relevant facts of the matter appear as they do. And so it no
longer suffices to invoke a notion of a potentially universal
community of consent in respect to my interpretation (the
community of “every reasonable person”). I have to retreat
to a restricted, one is here tempted to say “provincial,” notion
of community when I form an image of those who will find my
interpretation reasonable. I have done two things at this
point. I have abandoned the Universalizability Principle in
favor of the Restrictive Principle, and I have moved from
natural interpretation to “deep” interpretation. This is not,
according to Stern, a good thing.
When I shift from natural to deep interpretation, I effectively
move the potential source of confirmation of my interpretation
outside the object of interpretation, and thus it will only be by

the light of something alien to that object that my
interpretation will make sense or seem compelling. And in
doing so, I have effectively stopped speaking on behalf of the
object and started to make the object speak on behalf of a
theory I happen to champion. Now I may be so beholden to
my theory that I no longer see it as merely a theory, in which
case I will perhaps take myself to be offering a natural
interpretation in the subjunctive mood, though I’ll be guilty of
self-deception if this is the case. If I am not deceived, then
this raises obvious and important questions about the sincerity
of my interpretation, since what I say seems at root to be an
ideological move that I’ve just dressed up as an
“interpretation.” Either way, I will strike the community of
potential judges of my interpretation as revealing more fidelity
to my theory than to the person I am trying to make sense of,
and so I will seem to be one who interprets incompetently or
in bad-faith, neither of which does much good for my status as
an interpreter.
Here we see that in deep interpretations of this sort the
delicate but essential balance between the personal and
objective is lost. My interpretation gestures too much towards
me and the theory I embrace and too little towards the object
of interpretative scrutiny. In offering a deep interpretation, I
set an excessively “personal” condition for the acceptance of
my interpretation, indeed for my interpretation even to appear
reasonable to others: acceptance of the theory I happen to
favor. With this, my interpretation abandons the
Universalizability Principle and takes up the Restrictive
Principle, and it does so in such a way that will make one
doubt that I am really speaking in a genuinely interpretive
voice. I invoke the notion of the limited community of
“experts” to support my interpretation, and I claim that it is
only by virtue of membership in this community that one will
share my conception of the facts of the matter. At this point,
the idea that an interpretation should be guided by a
conception of the object of interpretation’s own selfunderstanding (indicatively or subjunctively understood) is
thrown aside. Whatever it is that I am up to here, it no longer
seems to be a sincere attempt to play the game of
interpretation.
This is controversial stuff, as Stern knows. Much of what our
colleagues in the humanities do is offer interpretations of this
deep sort. Indeed, many of the political, economic,
evolutionary, structuralist, historicist, psychoanalytic theories
(the list is nearly endless) that abound in the contemporary
university are as a matter of daily course enlisted to weave
the kind of interpretation Stern finds suspicious and of
questionable sincerity. It is refreshing to find an expression of
scepticism about the habit of applying these grand theories so
freely and so frequently uncritically. It is a habit that gives
rise to the impression that academics prefer to posture
knowingly in the presence of great questions rather than
attempt to say something actually informative about them:
something like the academic equivalent of what teenagers do
when they account for the wellspring of human motivation in
terms of one being a “jock,” a “loser,” a “rich kid,” or
“immature.” All this might be true in certain cases and at
some level, but there is something to be said in favor of asking
interpreters to be faithful to, if you will, the sense of self the

object of interpretation actually possesses, faithful to a
person’s motives as she honestly understands them, to an
artwork’s sense of its own purpose, to the concerns a social
group itself sees as underwriting its protests. Our conception
of an object’s “sense of self” will itself be interpretation
dependent; but we can at least build into our conception of the
interpretative enterprise a conception of answerability to the
object, of understanding it at least partly on its own terms,
even if we acknowledge we do not have direct, that is, noninterpretative, access to this. Whether or not one agrees with
all the particulars of Stern’s theory, he is to be commended for
asking us to take this commitment to interpretive fidelity much
more seriously than we often do when going about our
business as academics and critics.
3. A Modern Worry
I have one worry I will raise here. The worry I have is not so
much about Stern’s theory as it is about my inability to
understand how to apply it to kinds of art I would very much
like to be able apply it to, and I wish to ask Stern for his help
here. In a general way I have in mind much modernist art.
And of this, I am especially interested in a region of art Stern
himself cares about deeply: poetry.
My worry is that many of the features of Stern’s theory of
interpretation I find so attractive won’t be of much help when
confronting the very things for which I am most in need of a
theory of interpretation. The question of meaning is of a
different kind in the case of poetry, indeed in the case of art,
than the question of meaning in the case of human behavior.
I don’t take it to be especially surprising to say that when I
confront The Waste Land I will have to do very different things
as an interpreter than when I confront my sexually akratic
colleague. And I do not think Stern says anything to the
contrary. But the worry I have is that the difference is a
matter of the inevitable role of “theory” in the case of
interpreting (especially modernist) poems, theories that are
ultimately “foreign” to the poems but that are essential to the
successful interpretation of them. And I fear that Stern’s
excellent arguments against deep interpretations will have the
unwanted consequence of barring theory in cases where
theories are actually needed and helpful. Let me explain.
There is a sense, though surely a trivial one, in which every
answer we give to a question of meaning – the question,
again, that calls forth the interpretive enterprise itself – might
be seen as theory-laden to some degree. That is, it might be
the case that questions of meaning can never be answered
without the application of some sort of theory, even in the
case of simple human behavior, such as your responding “He
is afraid” when I ask you to solve the mystery of why a
mutual friend never visits the dentist. Just to give a sense of
how one might make a case for this, if certain philosophers
are correct, my very ability to make sense of others’ actions
requires the application of a “theory of mind” to a piece of
lively matter: to a thing that seems to be animated by the
same psychological states that animate my behavior. One
might even claim that the ability to appreciate a work of art
(as a work of art) inevitably requires a “theory of art”: a
theory of what a work of art is and the sorts of value it can

bear.
One can hear the voice of Wittgenstein here, chiding
something to the effect that “if this is a theory, then
everything is.” (To their credit, philosophers of mind almost
always put “theory” in scare quotes.) But be that as it may,
these would be harmless examples of an interpretive reliance
upon a theory, even for a Sternian interpreter. The reason for
this is that we can still respect the requirement of fidelity to
the object of interpretation when we apply these “theories,” for
they function to help the interpreter bring to light actual
features of the object of interpretation. When we apply these
theories, we are not imposing anything foreign upon the object
but are rather employing a “theoretical" vocabulary that allows
us to speak more accurately about what is internal to it. As
such, we can insist, in the natural and even universal voice, to
be offering an interpretation that has a claim to matching the
object’s own “self-understanding.”
But when we start to look at certain modern artistic practices,
the question of meaning cannot be answered without relying
on much more robust theories, theories that I fear a Sternian
interpreter will have to regard with suspicion, at least if she is
to be true to her theory. An example that I think pushes
Stern’s account to the edge, but not over it, concerns standard
ways of interpreting the sort of romantic poetry typified by
Wordsworth’s attempts to re-enchant nature. When critics
explore “The World Is Too Much with Us” and its various lines
about preferring to be a “Pagan suckled in a creed outworn” so
one can see “Proteus rising from the sea,” a sea that “bears
her bosom to the moon,” they do not spend much time talking
about the aesthetic features of its language, the beauty of the
images it provokes in the reader, etc. They might have
something to say about these and other features of the poem
that are in a sense “internal” to it. But a seasoned critic will
then quickly move on to matters that are, strictly speaking,
external to the poem but by the light of which the general
cultural and philosophical significance of the various lines of
the poem can be made explicit.
A common critical starting point is to regard Wordsworth’s
poem as an example of romanticism’s interest in contributing
to what scholars sometimes refer to as “the critique of
modernity,” however unlovable the phrase is. That is, a critic
will say something about the omnipresence of alienation in
modern industrial society, the importance of those artists
whose work forces us to confront the inauthenticity of modern
life, and the almost sacred function of those works of romantic
art that offer us what the “real” world has rendered
impossible: a way of recovering, if only for a moment and just
in the imagination, an authentic experience of nature, others,
and the self. Hopefully the critic will be less clichéd than I
have just been but, whatever she says, it will quickly begin to
look very much like a theory: a theory of modern culture and
of the revolutionary role art can play in it, a theory of how
poems that on the surface just speak of pagans and bosoms
can nonetheless be read as offering a direct and powerful
contribution to the critique of modernity, and so on. And note
that if you take the poem to be about these grander cultural
concerns that are nowhere mentioned in the poem itself, the
poem will only be shown to be about these matters in virtue of

this theory. It is by the light of a theory that is, strictly
speaking, external to the poem that the poem can be seen to
mean what the interpreter says it means.
I think Stern would simply wish to say that he does not have
anything against this sort of innocent application of theory,
though I do fear that his account of interpretation will not
allow us to distinguish innocent from illicit applications of
theory. The arguments Stern offers for his compelling and
very much welcome criticism of deep interpretation strike me
as also working against these. In both cases we rely on
theories “alien” to the work of art in virtue of which, and only
in virtue of which, the object appears to mean what we take it
to mean. As Stern himself says about the interpretation of
art: “Artworks are better served by focusing on the artwork
rather than its creator; unwarranted interpretations can be
excluded by concentrating on the distinction between internal
and external characteristics of a given artwork” (p. 92). It is,
at root, this distinction between the internal and the external
that is causing my worry. And this distinction breaks down
even more dramatically, I fear, once we move in the direction
of modernist poetry.
Now a Sternian interpreter might be able to tell a story that
would assuage my worries about the role of theory in
interpreting Wordsworth, and this should be acknowledged.
The title of the poem is, after all, “The World Is Too Much with
Us,” and it includes lines such as “Getting and spending, we
lay waste our powers/Little we see in Nature that is ours.” It
is perhaps a small step from this to claim that, even if my
theory is external to the poem, the poem quite explicitly issues
an invitation to apply a theory of this sort to it, and so the
bridge to what is external to the poem is erected by the poem
at least as much as by the interpreter. Or so the Sternian
interpreter might argue. But once we pass from romanticism
to modernism, the kind of story that will help the Sternian
interpreter of Wordsworth will no longer work. This is because
the “problem” of modernist poetry is precisely that the
question of meaning becomes so much more pronounced, to
such an extent that we often cannot ascribe even surface-level
meaning to a poem. We cannot determine what its lines are
even saying, what they are about in even the most basic
semantic and thematic sense, without the application of a
“theory.” And so even if we are to make a case that a certain
modernist poem issues an invitation to apply a theory to it,
the grounds we provide for claiming this will itself be theorydependent.
Of course it is not the case that every modernist poet pushes
language to the boundaries of sense and intelligibility; but like
modernist art in general, modernist poetry has largely earned
its reputation for difficulty because it does this so frequently.
Let me offer as an example of this difficulty, at its best (or
worst), a few stanzas from John Ashbery’s “Affordable
Variety”:[2]
           
           
           
           

Cathexis arrives early in a golden coach
We see stuff perched around,
mazes stuck in mazes,
knot of grapes at the throat, the horizon.

            And we couldn’t keep it coming.

            That is so.
            This is an invaded country.
            Dawn will abdicate all your book.
If my fidelity as an interpreter requires that I let the object of
interpretation speak for itself, what exactly does one listen for
in a poem like this? The very idea breaks down here. If I am
to beat even the most basic sense of aboutness out of these
lines, I have to do a tremendous amount of speaking on behalf
of the poem (the poem does, of course, act as a constraint in
all of this, so one needn’t worry that it is being ignored). Say,
for example, I decide to interpret these lines as about the
flutterings of subjective experience: the random and chaotic
shifting between perceptions, thoughts, feelings, memories,
and associations that, according to a theory I favor,
constitutes mental life (in modernity?). Or perhaps I will opt
for something else entirely, since one has the sense that the
possibilities are many in a way they certainly are not in the
case of Wordsworth’s poem. The point is, whatever
interpretation I offer will play the role of constituting, at least
from the standpoint of meaning, the poem itself.
There is no point in belaboring my worry that we shall have
trouble here respecting the Sternian interpreter’s wish to be
faithful to what is internal to the object of interpretation, to
speak on behalf of its “self-understanding” and not a theory
we favor, and so on. Instead I will conclude by saying that I
cannot shake the following feeling. It is the feeling that when
confronting modern art of this sort, the most disingenuous
expression of the interpretive voice, the most insincere thing
an interpreter could do, would be to speak as a sincere
Sternian interpreter would: to speak in a universal voice “as
if” the meaning one attributes to an object were a
“perceptual” feature of it, something to be found in it. In
other words, the feeling I cannot shake is that the very
features of interpretive sincerity that makes Stern’s theory so
attractive elsewhere have, in the case of exemplary kinds of
modernist art, the consequence of making the interpreter look
wildly dishonest.
At any rate, this is the entanglement of issues I would like to
ask Stern to help me to straighten out. It is a sign of the
extraordinary reach of Stern’s theory that I have had to look
to some of the more freakish regions of modern art to find a
question for him. And even here I have not unearthed an
inconsistency in Stern’s theory. Despite appearances (and all
the words), all I’ve really done is ask Stern how he would
apply his theory to an issue he was not concerned with in his
book. And if one worries about its application to stranger
sorts of interpretive phenomena, there should be no doubt that
Stern’s elegant and fascinating study shines much light on
those interpretive practices we rely upon in our daily
encounters with one another and the world.
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Endnotes
[1] See, for example, Wittgenstein’s reflections on rulefollowing in Philosophical Investigations, especially §201-§211.
[2] Where Shall I Wander, (New York: Ecco Press, 2005), p.
3.

